THE USE OF SYMBOLIC MACHINES

 

 

0. Introduction

The last remarkable innovation is “artificial intelligence”. This innovation, like all the previous ones, is subject to both, and sometimes at the same time, praise and criticism often out of proportion. What seems to be new today is that it is a machine that does intellectual work and no longer manual. But is it really new? And is this machine really smart? We’ll see... We will also ask whether the problems raised by this innovation are not, as with previous ones, more ethical and political than technical.

 

1. Intelligence and problem solving

“Intelligence” can mean the ability to solve a problem: e.g., finding a way out, solving an equation, correctly answering a question, understanding a speech, winning at chess (it is a more pragmatic definition than the one found in the dictionary, such as «mental function of organization of the real in thought»). “Intelligence” can be that of a human, collective, animal or machine.

There are different types of intelligences according to different beings and also for a same being. A human being can have a relational, practical, creative, logical intelligence, etc. Finally, intelligence is also the ability to use a variety of forms of intelligences, that is to say, to alternate and combine these different forms of intelligences.

Second, to say that someone is “intelligent” is to make a positive value judgment. And if we talk about an «intelligent» object (game, book, accessory, machine), this values the object as well as its creator, its user or its owner. Then they get a power (even if it can be misused).

 

2. Artifact as an intentional product of Man

On the other hand, to say that a being or thing is “artificial” can have a negative connotation and mean “false”, “overdone”, “unauthentic”, “useless”. It is considered to be an inferior copy of its model (e.g., a flower or artificial aroma).

But this connotation is not necessary. The expression “artificial intelligence” generally refers to machine-generated intelligence and nothing more (although the positive connotation of “artificial intelligence” can be contrasted with the negative connotation of “artificial intelligence”). The connotation of “artificial” can even become positive if one recognizes, through this word, a feat of human genius capable of creating an intelligent machine.

The term “artifact” avoids the connotative interference attached to “artifice”. «Artifact» refers to the products of human intelligence: tools, instruments, machines, works, institutions. If the artifact is a product of human intelligence, and if this artifact is also intelligent itself, then it can be considered as an extension of human intelligence, that is to say an indirect way for humans to be intelligent. If artificial intelligence were to be considered more intelligent than human intelligence, it would constitute a remarkable feat of human intelligence.

Unlike the artifact, the natural product exists independently of man, and more precisely independently of his conscious and voluntary action. E.g. a handprint on a wall is not an artifact if it is not intentional. Natural products are animals, plants, solids, liquids and all biological, chemical and physical processes that exist by themselves and without our assistance. Man can also be counted in some way among natural products.

What constitutes the artifact is therefore the result of human intelligent action, that is to say, Nature intentionally transformed by Man. Human side-effects such as pollution, waste, accidents or “misalignments” (AI’s unintended behaviors) cannot then be considered artifacts - even if it seems unintuitive to call them “natural”.

 

 

3. The difference between human and artificial intelligence

The artifact becomes “intelligent” when it can autonomously perform operations that recall human intelligent activity: calculating, playing music or games, detecting and alerting, pausing or running, translate, answer orders or questions, correct his errors etc. Sometimes the artifice is much superior to man (speed of calculation, memory storage). But it remains specialized in specific tasks, where man performs an incalculable number of different operations.

Intelligent artifact can be considered as a symbolic machine as opposed to an instrumental machine. Machine represents a technological evolution based on use of a motor instead of muscle strength. Machines are developments in instrumental techniques related to manual activities (e.g., machine tools or vehicles). Symbolic techniques, such as writing, have in turn evolved into mechanical forms (e.g., printing, typewriters, telecommunications, calculators, etc.). Symbolic machines process, as contents, graphic, sound, numerical and alphabetic symbols. But they could not do so without, as instrumental extensions, their receiving or effecting interfaces to interact with the outside world. The development of these interfaces leads to robotics, when inputs and outputs of the processor become more elaborate than a keyboard and a screen. We can say that robot is the body development of computer.

This raises the question of continuity between the instrumental and the symbolic. Is the symbolic miniaturization of the instrumental? Can we reduce operations on symbols to causal processes? Is the process between the keyboard and the calculator screen only one continuous mechanical transmission? Can we say the same about what happens between eye and hand when e.g. calculating on paper? If so, how do we explain consciousness, freedom or creativity? 

These questions refer to analyses of philosophy of mind which will not be dealt with here. What we can see now is that a technical evaluation of artificial or human intelligence consists in measuring their performance from a mechanical point of view, in terms of power, speed of calculation or intellectual quotient. In this respect, machines can be much more efficient than humans (just like cars, trains or planes when it comes to travel). For example, an automatic translator can also be estimate, to determine whether it is translating correctly (even if it’s done without skill and sensitivity of a human being), just as it can be used to determine if an aircraft is flying properly.

 

4. Ethical review and innovation neutrality

If the technical assessment tells us whether something is doing an action effectively or correctly, then the ethical assessment is about whether that action is good. A scammer can act “well” technically, but it will not be said that he acts “well” ethically. An action, we can say, is absolutely ethical if it is good for all men and for the world in general. But this is no more precise than saying that an action is good if it is good. Saying e.g. the medicine is good and the poison is bad only clarifies their definition. This is no more instructive than saying that health, joy, happiness, well-being and friendship are good in themselves.

And if we are talking about poisoning a dangerous tyrant, it is in principle only a question of denying the negation, as «punishing the guilty», «eliminating the evil», «eradicating the disease», which is equally abstract. But if we approach ethics from a concrete point of view, evaluation becomes relative. What is good for one here may be bad for another there; what is good at that moment can be bad later and vice versa.

From an abstract point of view, regardless of the particular situations, the existence of most innovations is not bad in itself. In other words, they are neutral.  This is the case for e.g. automobile, computer, telephone, television, refrigerator, backhoe, etc. Ethical issues arise when it comes to qualifying inventions against facts. They become sometimes good, sometimes bad. Automobile e.g. does not automatically guarantee the happiness and well-being of humans.

A radical way to solve ethical problem is to eliminate its object, as if one cured the patient by simply making him disappear. If we get rid of certain technologies, then will disappear, more or less quickly, their perverse effects (with their salutary effects). This is comparable to what philosophers do who, instead of answering a question, say that it has no meaning. We must then make sure that this is the case, otherwise it would only be a rhetorical parade. There are many innovations that look like problems without solutions, those that are negative by definition: weapons of mass destruction, robots-killers, torture instruments, pesticides, etc. But to reject computers, phones or cars, as fundamentally bad, seems difficult to justify (but not impossible). Nevertheless, just as it can be shown that a question may have been asked in the wrong way, some innovations can be regarded as having been misplaced and needing to be conceived differently. This is the case of products containing asbestos, lead, DDT, radium e.g. etc.

 

5. The ethical response of regulation

Most of the ethical problems we face cannot be completely solved or eliminated. It seems inconceivable that we would deliberately abandon most of the technologies we use, nor that we could permanently eliminate the risks they pose. We then have to try to regulate them as well as possible. For this, it is necessary to intervene on several levels: upstream, as when the motor of a car is derated; downstream, with retarders on roads, signs, radars, gendarmes and judges. The regulation responds to a desire for safety in order to contain the overflow (e.g. speeding) or prevent the occurrence of a feared phenomenon (e.g. accident).

            Regulation involves rules, which define limits, and means of application: instruments, incentives, sanctions, controls, corrections etc. (some rules appear to regulate the previous rules, such as those that limit abuse of power). Failure to apply a rule is equivalent to an unrealized architect’s plan or the composer’s score not performed.

 

6. Freedom as regulation

A naive or dishonest conception of freedom is to equate it with the absence of rules, instead of distinguishing between rules that are approved and those that are disapproved and experienced as oppressive. There are e.g. grammar rules without which we could not speak and social rules that can be perceived as a barrier to freedom of expression.

At the political level, a rule legitimately interferes with our action when it guarantees protection against arbitrary interference. A rule is legitimate if it can be recognized by all as good, which means that we must be able to recognize that it can be useful to anyone. The rule applies to any person, universal and possible.

            The motivation of the search for a balance of interests and skills is the possibility of being harmed by an imbalance. The aim is to set aside what makes me or would make me suffer if it happened to me. Morality is generally described as selfless. But in a sense it is hyper-interested: to act as if what happens to others could happen to me too.

 

7. The democratic regulation of human and non-human

The ethical rules must make it possible to minimize or even abolish domination, exploitation and ignorance; this in order to reduce or even eliminate suffering. They are democratic in essence insofar as they take into account the expertise and involvement of each person, rather than a paternalistic authority. This is what differentiates the absence of suffering, through the free development of each one, from anaesthesia as elimination of sensitivity. Democracy means power for and by all, and should therefore extend to all levels of decision-making, in infrastructure and superstructure, in society and the state. It is a matter of balancing evaluation and decision everywhere in an optimal way.

Democratic activity is about the relationship between humans and their relationship to their natural and artificial environment. In other words, the decision-making circuit integrates questions of practices to be adopted vis-à-vis humans, animals, machines, plants and land. And it is through human speech that the non-human expresses itself, as vulnerable or threatening.

 

8. Conclusions

            We invent tools that increase our problem-solving abilities and thus our intelligence. To this end, symbolic machines and intelligent artifacts imitate and multiply certain aspects of human intelligence. It is a virtuous circle: human intelligence produces instrumental intelligence to develop itself (e.g., calculi, abaque, pascaline, etc.). These techniques and machines designed to solve problems are therefore good by definition. Judging artificiality pejoratively is a matter of prejudice. A human without artifice is not a human. But attribution of human qualities to machines, such as consciousness, freedom or creativity, is fiction.

Regulation is a human activity of solving technical and ethical problems. It uses instrumental and symbolic techniques that need to be regulated too. The purpose of these regulations is to direct innovations towards the good. Thus, human intelligence allows both innovation and regulation to avoid the dangers associated with these innovations.

Regulation is presented as a therapy, following a critical diagnosis of innovations and their harms. These emerge from social practices linked to the uses of innovations and the vicious circles in which they are caught. But the important question is who makes the diagnosis and the therapy. Because innovation criticism can respond to different underlying strategies. For example, some criticism of innovations, especially when it comes from bodies curiously interested in their development, can be used to demonstrate their effectiveness. Or criticism of innovations may be aimed at masking the human responsibility of some authorities. These are all reasons to defend democratic approaches to the diagnosis and treatment of innovations.

More generally, democratic procedures must be able to deal with the complexity of phenomena and to accommodate the diversity of situations and their changes in time and space. Democratic regulation should be carried out on various scales: first, at the individual reflexive level, with self-government; in the family and community, with daily discipline; in the organization of work and collectives or associations; in institutions and civil service; and in international bodies. It is the combination of these different strata that should make it possible to contain the negative externalities and counter-objectives related to innovations. Let us add, as virtues inherent in democratic regulation, the fact that decisions taken democratically have a legitimate character, and that democratic practices develop intelligence. Technological change alone cannot contribute to the construction of viable societies if it is not accompanied by the development of democratic practices.

 Raphaël Edelman, Nantes, May 2025